My earlier entry on consciousness had an interesting side-effect which I can't recall at the moment. I should have written it down earlier, but I'm sure it will present itself when the problem it solves next presents itself.
There is a problem with it though. It by no means describes, or even begins to describe, the causal properties of consciousness as we consider it. In my earlier description, there was no means for a processes consciousness to affect the process, which is the element we're most worried about when we discuss consciousness. I'm surprised no one brought it up as obvious.
The good news is that it's a defining feature. We can talk about it outside of consciousness, though I'd prefer to define the robust consciousness that we have by it. You might think self-awareness is just as good a term, but it doesn't suggest a causal quality in (robust) consciousness--instead it puts that quality in an awareness, which is not guaranteed to be conscious awareness.
Finally, we know that consciousness is causal simply because it is topical. Our attempts to define it amount to so much phlogiston, and we don't much know what difference it would make if our consciousness were not robust in the sense above. All we know is that conversations about it wouldn't exist. (So, I would admit that the earlier picture is a fiction, but with true and accurate consequences.)
My computer has yet to be shipped. I need to do a ton of programming and I simply can't.
Some of it is loosely related to the above: I've got a lot of work to do on an AI app that I'd really like to be doing right now. There's also the matter of all of my music being unavailable to me. My Zen has died and my attempts at resurrection have all failed.
There may be a well-paying job for me in London (ONT., CA) that I could do drunk (and, I've found, many do) having to do with System Administration. I'll have to look into that.
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